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From New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing1 in 1992, to Brothers 
Records, Inc. v. Jardine2 in 2003, the Ninth Circuit remains enamored of nominative fair 
use.  Unfortunately, this judge-made doctrine has never been tethered to the fundamental 
principles of trademark law.  Thus, as the Ninth Circuit applied this doctrine, it left a 
series of decisions plagued with muddled reasoning and inconsistent results in its wake.  
The Ninth Circuit finally seemed to realize the doctrine’s fundamental tension with the 
Lanham Act in its latest application earlier this year in Brothers Records, Inc.3  When the 
court attempted to salvage the doctrine by anchoring it to a likelihood of confusion 
analysis, the doctrine’s demise was unwittingly made complete.  Following Jardine, the 
nominative fair use doctrine collapses.  It is time for the Ninth Circuit to acknowledge the 
failure of its foray into creative doctrine-making and get back to the business of applying 
the law to decide trademark cases. 
Judge Kozinski first articulated the nominative fair use doctrine in New Kids on the 
Block.4  In that case, two newspapers were running telephone polls asking readers to vote 
for their favorite “New Kid.”  The New Kids on the Block sued the newspapers for 
trademark infringement.  The Ninth Circuit found the papers’ use permissible, but only 
after creating the then-novel nominative fair use doctrine that applied where the 
defendant was using the plaintiff’s trademark to refer to the plaintiff’s product.  In these 
limited situations, the court noted that the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis 
gives way to a special three-pronged test.5  This nominative fair use defense insulates a 
commercial defendant if three requirements are met: 
the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without 
use of the trademark; 
only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to 
identify the product or service; and 
the defendant must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, 
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.6 
 ∗  J.D. 2001, Yale Law School.  Attorney in the law firm of Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & 
Geraldson. 
1 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
2 318 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2003). 
3 Id. 
4 Supra note 1. 
5 See id. at 308. 
6 See id. 
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¶3 This seemingly benign test was a radical departure from trademark law, because the 
nominative fair use defense displaces the likelihood of confusion analysis.7  The 
departure from the likelihood of confusion analysis is aggravated by the court’s strict 
reading of its own third factor, namely that that “defendant must do nothing” (emphasis 
added) to suggest sponsorship or affiliation.  This action-based language immediately 
drove a wedge between the doctrine and consumer perception.  Combine this with Judge 
Kozinski’s statement that the test “lies outside the strictures of trademark law,”8 and it is 
no surprise that courts tend to pay little or no attention to consumer perception once a 
case comes within the purview of the nominative fair use doctrine.  For example, in 
Cairns, the court focused almost exclusively on what the defendant did and did not do.  It 
made no reference to consumer perception.  Similarly, the courts in Downing v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch9 and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles10 all but ignored the 




The subtle shift from consumer perception to the defendant’s conduct is a 
fundamental break with trademark law.  The Lanham Act creates liability only for 
“use . . . [that] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”11  As 
Professor McCarthy explains, “[u]nder the Lanham Act, the only test of infringement is 
‘likelihood of confusion,’ which is a factual issue focusing upon the probable reaction of 
buyers, not the subjective state of mind of the defendant seller.”12  Thus, the nominative 
fair use test disregards the very real possibility that the defendant’s use, with nothing 
more, might create a likelihood of confusion. 
The Ninth Circuit attempted to justify its abandonment of the likelihood of 
confusion analysis by arguing that the “application of the Sleekcraft13 test, which focuses 
on the similarity of the mark used by the plaintiff and the defendant, would lead to the 
incorrect conclusion that virtually all nominative uses are confusing.”14  In other words, 
the Ninth Circuit created a new doctrine because it didn’t like the results if it applied the 
law.  This is judicial activism run amuck.  In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s stated reason 
for abandoning the Sleekcraft test, namely that it would require a finding of infringement, 
is flat out wrong.  Contrary to the court’s contention, similarity of the marks is not 
dispositive.  As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, 
[w]e do not decide whether confusion is likely by considering 
mechanically the number of Sleekcraft factors that weigh in favor of either 
7 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).  This is in stark contrast to 
statutory fair use, see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b), which only complements the likelihood of confusion analysis.  
See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150. 
8 New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
9 265 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[t]here is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the third criterion is met, whether [defendant] did nothing that would in conjunction with the 
Appellants’ names and pictures suggest sponsorship or endorsement by Appellants”) (emphasis added). 
10 279 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “in addition to doing nothing in conjunction with her 
use of the marks to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by [plaintiff], [defendant] affirmatively disavows 
any sponsorship or endorsement”) (emphasis added). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
12 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23, 107 (4th 
ed. 2003). 
13 AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
14 Welles, 279 F.3d at 801. 
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party, or by giving the same weight to a particular factor from case to 
case. . . . [A]s we apply the Sleekcraft test, we consider what each factor, 
and—more importantly—what the analysis as a whole, reveals about the 
ultimate question before us: the likelihood of consumer confusion as to the 






In stark contrast to the justification mentioned in Welles, “[t]he Sleekcraft factors 
are [] a ‘guide’ to decision-making, intended to channel the analytical process but not to 
dictate any result.”16  Thus, a finding of a likelihood of confusion under Sleekcraft is not a 
reason to eliminate the test but rather simply proof that the defendant’s conduct is indeed 
infringing. 
Recently, in Jardine, the Ninth Circuit implicitly acknowledged the rift the doctrine 
created with trademark law and thereby attempted to preserve the doctrine by finally 
tying it to the Lanham Act.  To do so, the third factor was refocused on consumer 
perception.  Citing Professor McCarthy, the Jardine court noted that “the third 
requirement of the nominative fair use defense—the lack of anything that suggests 
sponsorship or endorsement—is merely the other side of the likelihood-of-confusion 
coin.”17 
While this re-conceptualization is consistent with the Lanham Act, neither the 
Ninth Circuit, nor for that matter, Professor McCarthy realized the inevitable result, 
namely the demise of the doctrine.  This is caused, in large part, by the Ninth Circuit’s 
adherence to nominative fair use as an affirmative defense.  As with any affirmative 
defense, the burden shifts to the defendant: “whereas plaintiff carries the burden of 
persuasion in a trademark infringement claim to show a likelihood of confusion, the 
nominative fair use defense shifts to the defendant the burden of proving no likelihood of 
confusion.”18  Thus, to prevail under the nominative fair use defense, a defendant must 
prove the absence of a likelihood of confusion.  Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties 
in proving a negative, the burden shifting makes it more difficult for a defendant to 
prevail under Jardine than under Sleekcraft.  Since the threshold issue, namely likelihood 
of confusion, is now the same in both tests, nominative fair use serves no function not 
already encompassed under Sleekcraft.  Ironically, the only difference is that nominative 
fair use, created in New Kids to help the defendant, carries with it a more onerous burden 
of proof than Sleekcraft.  In other words, a defendant will have an easier time defending 
under the Sleekcraft test than he would under the Jardine version of nominative fair use.19  
Thus, in its efforts to salvage the doctrine by bringing it into line with trademark law, the 
Ninth Circuit unwittingly eliminated the nominative fair use doctrine by making the test 
superfluous. 
Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s problematic application of the doctrine it 
created, the idea of nominative fair use could still have a place in trademark law.  It 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1141. 
17 Jardine, 318 F.3d at 908 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003). 
18 Id. 
19 If the defendant fails to carry its burden under the nominative fair use test, the plaintiff does not 
prevail; rather, the plaintiff is then forced to carry its burden under Sleekcraft.  Thus, under Jardine, the 
nominative fair use defense has become the superfluous first step in an artificial two-step analysis. 
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should not be a formal doctrine but rather merely a descriptive reminder.  A nominative 
use involves a situation where a defendant is using a plaintiff’s mark to refer to the 
plaintiff.  Some nominative uses may be confusing, while others may not.  Thus, 
nominative fair use should be nothing more than a term used to describe a peculiar fact 
pattern that, given the specific facts of the case, does not lead to a likelihood of 
confusion.20  Nevertheless, given the decade-long infatuation with a formalistic doctrine, 
courts would do well to eliminate temporarily the nominative fair use phrase from their 
vocabularies lest they fall into Judge Kozinski’s trap, doing more harm than good. 
20 As Professor McCarthy correctly notes, “nominative fair use” is “a term to denote one situation in 
which a mark is used in a manner that does not cause confusion and is therefore non-infringing.”  3 
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23, at 11.  Professor McCarthy makes the same argument with respect to 
statutory fair use: “‘[F]air use’ should be viewed as merely one type of use not likely to cause confusion 
and hence is a ‘defense’ only in that sense.”  2 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 11, at 47. 
